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DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN
OHIO’S 2005 TORT REFORM ACT
CANNOT SURVIVE
A RATIONAL BASIS CHALLENGE
Janet G. Abaray ∗

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Ohio Legislature recently enacted a massive “tort reform”
package, which became effective in April of 2005. Like its many
predecessor enactments, this legislation, entitled Senate Bill 80, directly
impacts the constitutional rights of every Ohio citizen. If upheld by the
courts, Senate Bill 80 will deprive Ohio tort victims of remedies for their
injuries, remedies which the Ohio Supreme Court has repeatedly held in a
long series of decisions to be constitutionally guaranteed.
Not only does Senate Bill 80 defy long-standing Ohio Supreme
Court precedent, but Senate Bill 80 also lacks any rational basis. Instead,
Senate Bill 80 relies upon anecdotal evidence, hyperbole and political
position papers to attempt to justify the deliberate destruction of the
constitutional rights of Ohio citizens. An analysis of the conjecture upon
which Senate Bill 80 is based reveals that the Ohio Legislature acted
irrationally in enacting Senate Bill 80. Indeed the evidence cited by the
Ohio General Assembly in enacting Senate Bill 80 fails to satisfy any of the
indicia of reliability required by courts for admissibility. Ironically then, in
attacking the judicial system for allegedly unpredictable and unreliable
results, the Ohio Legislature itself acts without a rational basis, and thereby
violates the rights guaranteed citizens by the Ohio Constitution.
II.

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO
LEGISLATION

In reviewing statutes challenged under constitutional grounds,
courts apply varying levels of scrutiny dependent upon the nature of the
constitutional challenge. The highest level of review, strict scrutiny, applies
when the challenged legislation implicates a constitutionally protected right.

_______________________________________________________
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Thus legislation challenged due to infringement of such constitutional rights
as the right to trial by jury, or the right to remedy and open courts, are
subject to review on a strict scrutiny basis.1 In addition, in the equal
protection context, challenges to legislation based on constitutionally
protected characteristics such as race, religion, or national origin are subject
to strict scrutiny.2
Under strict scrutiny, courts demand that the
classification further a “compelling governmental interest” which is
“narrowly tailored to further [that] governmental interest[].”3
On the other hand, equal protection and due process challenges that
do not implicate a constitutionally protected class or do not interfere with a
constitutionally protected right are reviewed on a lesser standard, the
rational basis test. Under rational basis review, courts determine whether
the “classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental
interest or if reasonable grounds exist for drawing the distinction.”4 Stated
another way, legislation will withstand rational basis scrutiny if there exists
“any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis
for the classification[,]”5 or if “the relationship of the classification to its
goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational . . .
.”6 Moreover, the state “has no obligation whatsoever ‘to produce evidence
to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification.’”7 Instead, the burden
is on the challenger to demonstrate that no conceivable basis exists to
support the legislation.8
III.

BINDING OHIO SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT HOLDS TORT REFORM
TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL

In the tort reform context, the Ohio Supreme Court applied strict
scrutiny to a challenge of the collateral source rule provision of the Tort
Reform Act of 1987.9 This rule required a plaintiff to disclose, and a court

_______________________________________________________
1

See e.g. Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
Classifications based on race, religion, or national origin are subject to the highest level of scrutiny.
However, classifications based on sex (which is not a constitutionally protected characteristic) are subject
to intermediate scrutiny, requiring only that the classification “serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976).
3
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003); see also Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Ohio’s Equal
Protection and Due Process clauses are analyzed identically to that of the federal Equal Protection and
Due Process clauses. Am. Assn. of U. Profs. v. Central St. U., 717 N.E.2d 286, 291 (Ohio 1999).
4
Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co., 748 N.E.2d 1111, 1126 (Ohio 2001); see also State ex rel. Ohio Acad.
of Tr. Laws. v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999).
5
Am. Assn. of U. Profs., 717 N.E.2d at 290 (quoting FCC v. Beach Commun., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313
(1993)).
6
Id. (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992)).
7
Id. (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).
8
Id.
9
See Sorrell v. Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504 (Ohio 1994). The Ohio Supreme Court accepted this battery
case on appeal after the Common Pleas court found the statute unconstitutional, and the appellate court
reversed and remanded on a split decision. Id. at 507. The Court consolidated the appeal with a
2
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thereby to deduct from the jury award, collateral benefits such as insurance
proceeds or worker’s compensation benefits the plaintiff received from third
parties.10 The plaintiffs alleged the statute violated the following sections of
the Ohio Constitution: Section 16, Article I (due process, right to a remedy
and open courts), Section 2, Article I (equal protection), and Section 5,
Article I (right to a jury trial).11 Given that the right to a jury trial is a
fundamental right,12 the Court applied strict scrutiny, finding that the postverdict deduction of collateral benefits impermissibly violated the
“plaintiff’s right to have all facts determined by the jury, including
damages.”13
The Ohio Supreme Court also indicated that because the
governmental action at issue implicated the fundamental right to a jury trial,
the more stringent strict scrutiny standard would apply to the due process
and equal protection challenges as well.14 The Court, however, determined
that the statute could not survive even under the more deferential rational
basis analysis, so it struck down the statute based on this minimal level of
scrutiny.15 The Court found that the statute’s purpose of reducing the causes
of a perceived insurance crisis did not “bear a real and substantial
relationship to the health, safety, morals or general welfare” and was
“unreasonable and arbitrary” because empirical evidence of such an
insurance crisis, and its relationship to tort reform legislation, was scarce.16
Furthermore, the Court found that although the goal of preventing double
recoveries for plaintiffs was legitimate, the means enumerated in the statute
were “irrational and arbitrary” because “the statute can arbitrarily reduce
damages that a jury awards a plaintiff, since under the statute it is irrelevant
whether any collateral benefit actually represents any portion of the jury’s
award.”17
The Ohio Supreme Court also found that the collateral benefit rule
failed strict scrutiny on equal protection grounds because non-medical
malpractice tort awards were subject to deduction of collateral benefits
while medical malpractice tort awards were not.18 The Court found that this
negligence case from which the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Ohio certified questions of law
pertaining to the constitutionality of the statute. Id. 506-507.
10
Id. at 508-509 (citing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.45 of the Tort Reform Act of 1987, Am.Sub.H.B.
No. 1, 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1661, 1694).
11
Id.
12
The right to a jury trial is guaranteed “only for those causes of actions where the right existed at
common law at the time the Ohio Constitution was adopted.” Id. at 510. Because negligence derived
from the common law cause of action of trespass, which existed at the time the Ohio Constitution was
adopted, as did battery actions, the right to a jury trial is a fundamental right in these types of actions. Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 511.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 512.
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classification did not meet the compelling governmental interests of
preventing double recoveries or aiding a questionable insurance crisis.19
Again, the Court noted that the statute also would not have withstood the
rational basis test on equal protection grounds due to the arbitrary
classification of tort victims.20
Subsequent to the Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion in Sorrell, the
Ohio legislature attempted again to require jury awards in personal injury
cases to be reduced by consideration of collateral benefits. Under House
Bill 350, the General Assembly reinstated a law requiring consideration of
collateral benefits in jury verdicts.21 Instead of mandating that courts deduct
collateral benefits post-verdict, this statute instead permitted introduction of
evidence at trial of a plaintiff’s receipt of collateral benefits, in order to
allow a jury to account for them in determining what amount, if any, a
plaintiff should receive.22 The Ohio Supreme Court in Sheward noted that
the change from a post-verdict, mandatory deduction by the court to a preverdict, discretionary deduction by the jury eradicated any possible
impingement upon the fundamental right to a jury trial.23 The Court then
applied the rational basis test, rather than strict scrutiny, to the collateral
benefits provision of House Bill 350.24 However, the Court found that the
provision still failed rational basis for the same reasons that it also failed
rational basis analysis in Sorrell – because it arbitrarily and unreasonably
gathers all evidence of collateral source payments,
regardless of the category of harm for which it
compensates and regardless of whether it compensates for
past or future losses, tosses it in an indiscriminate heap
along with all categories and items of compensatory
damages, and authorizes, out of that, a general verdict
replete with collateral benefit setoffs.25
In addition to the rational basis analysis employed in Sorrell, the
Ohio Supreme Court utilized rational basis review within the context of tort
reform legislation elsewhere. For example, the Court applied the rational
basis test in examining whether a medical malpractice statute of limitations

_______________________________________________________
19

Id.
Id. at 513.
21
Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1088-1089.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 1089.
25
Id. at 1090. Similarly, the current collateral source rule of Senate Bill 80, R.C. 2315.20, allows a
defendant to introduce evidence of collateral benefits payable to a plaintiff during the trial, thus
eliminating any concerns of violating the right to a jury trial. 2004 Ohio Legis. Serv. L-1911 (BanksBaldwin) also available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/bills.cfm?ID=125_SB_80 (accessed Dec.
26, 2005). The rule is, of course, still open to rational basis analysis.
20
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violated the Ohio Constitution’s equal protection.26 The statute required
minors under ten years of age whose cause of action had accrued to file any
of their claims within four years; however, minors ten years of age or older
whose cause of action had accrued only had a year to file any of their claims
before being barred by the statute of limitations.27 The Court applied a
rational basis analysis given that the challenge to the provision did “not
involve either a fundamental right or a suspect class.”28 The Court
determined that the statute failed rational basis review because a child
whose cause of action accrued one day before her tenth birthday would have
four years to file a claim, while a child whose cause of action accrued one
day after her tenth birthday would only have one year to file; therefore, the
statute served no rational relationship to the purpose of curbing the
perceived medical malpractice crisis.29
Three years later, the Court evaluated the amended version of the
medical malpractice statute of limitations pertaining to minors at issue in
Schwan.30 Pursuant to Schwan, the revised statute eradicated the distinction
between minors under the age of ten and minors over the age of ten, but
made the statute of limitations period for a minor involved in a medical
malpractice claim equivalent to that of an adult in a medical malpractice
case.31 However, the statute of limitations for minors in non-medical
malpractice claims whose claims had accrued was tolled until they reached
the age of majority, at which time they had one year to file a claim.32
Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the statute on due process
grounds, and the Court employed rational basis review to determine whether
the statute “b[ore] a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare of the public” and was not “unreasonable or
arbitrary.”33 The Court found that the statute did not bear a substantial
relationship to the legislature’s proffered goal of reducing medical
malpractice insurance premiums given no evidence was provided that
minors involved in malpractice cases affected insurance premiums or even
“constitute[d] a significant portion of all medical malpractice claims.”34
Additionally, the Court concluded that the statute unreasonably and
arbitrarily precluded minors from exercising their right to redress, because

_______________________________________________________
26

Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 452 N.E.2d 1337 (Ohio 1983).
Id. at 1338 (quoting former R.C. 2305.11(B)).
28
Id.
29
Id. at 1339. As further support of this finding, the Court noted that the Act of which the provision at
issue was a part required the Superintendent of Insurance to report annually to the legislature the
effectiveness of amendments on decreasing medical malpractice insurance. Id. The effects of this
provision, however, were insufficiently significant to warrant inclusion in the report. Id.
30
See Mominee v. Scherbath, 503 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio 1986).
31
Id. at 719-720.
32
Id. at 719.
33
Id. at 720-721.
34
Id. at 721.
27
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minors have no standing to sue as minors and were effectively barred from
bringing a medical malpractice claim upon attaining majority.35
The Ohio Supreme Court also applied the rational basis test in
examining whether general damages caps for medical malpractice claims
violated due process and equal protection under the Ohio Constitution.36
The statute at issue there, R.C. 2307.43 of the Ohio Medical Malpractice
Act, limited recovery of general damages in medical malpractice claims to
$200,000.37 The Court decided rational basis review was appropriate given
a fundamental right or suspect class was not involved.38 The Court held that
the cap failed rational basis scrutiny because a rational connection between
damage awards over $200,000 and medical malpractice insurance rates was
unfounded.39 The Court also found the damages cap unreasonably and
arbitrarily shifted the costs of the intended benefit “solely upon a class
consisting of those most severely injured by medical malpractice.”40 With
respect to the alleged equal protection violation, the Court found that the
statute did not fail rational basis review, assuming that a medical
malpractice insurance crisis conceivably could have existed.41
The most recent and comprehensive discussion of tort reform
legislation occurred in State v. Sheward.42 There, the Court struck down the
then-current tort reform legislation, House Bill 350, in its entirety for
multiple reasons, mostly involving separation of powers issues.43 With
regard to damage caps, however, the Court found that the provision
requiring the court to reduce punitive damages awards that exceeded the
statutory amount specified violated the fundamental right to a jury trial by
substituting the legislature’s will for that of the jury.44 Additionally, the
Court found that the general damages cap on all tort claims, similar to the
medical malpractice cap struck down in Morris, violated due process for
exactly the same reasons as the statute in Morris–it unreasonably and
arbitrarily “continue[d] to impose the cost of the intended benefit to the
general public solely upon a class consisting of those most severely injured

_______________________________________________________
35
Id. The Court also commented that the fact a parent or guardian could sue on behalf of the minor did
not afford adequate protection to the minor because such a parent or guardian may not be aware that a
wrongdoing had occurred until too late. Id. Also, the parent or guardian may be barred by minority or
simply choose not to bring an action, or the minor may not have a parent or guardian. Id. at 721-722.
Such situations, the Court posited, would then pit minors against their parents or guardians for failing to
file a claim – an unrealistic recourse for minors in the eyes of the Court. Id. at 722.
36
See Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991).
37
Id. at 767.
38
Id. at 769-770.
39
Id. at 770. In fact, the Court found that evidence to the contrary existed. Id. at 770-771.
40
Id. at 771 (quoting Nervo v. Pritchard, Stark App. No. CA-6560, slip op. at 8 (June 10, 1985)).
41
Id.
42
715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999).
43
See supra nn. 22-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of Sheward.
44
Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1091.
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by tortious conduct.”45
Aside from the equal protection and due process analysis discussed
above, the Ohio Supreme Court has also addressed the validity of tort
reform legislation in light of the right-to-a-remedy and open courts
provisions of Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.46 In particular,
the Court has found that statutes of repose violate this right.47 The Court in
Hardy v. VerMeulen expressly stated that “the right-to-a-remedy provision
of Section 16, Article I does not require the analysis of rational-basis that is
used to decide due process or equal protection arguments against the
constitutionality of legislation.”48 The Court noted in a subsequent footnote
that “[i]n other jurisdictions, statutes of repose, having features similar to
ours, have been analyzed on due process and equal protection grounds. The
courts are divided on the question of whether due process and equal
protection arguments render a statute of repose unconstitutional.”49
Similarly, the Court in Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co. made no mention of any
level of scrutiny in examining whether the statute of repose at issue there
violated the right to remedy provision of the Ohio Constitution.50
IV.

OHIO’S 2005 TORT REFORM LEGISLATION, SENATE BILL 80,
CANNOT SURVIVE THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST

As described above, the Ohio Supreme Court struck down many
prior attempts by the legislature to enact tort reform, even when it analyzed
the legislation under the minimal, rational basis test. In enacting Senate Bill
80, the General Assembly cites nothing new or different to distinguish this
latest attempt to enact tort reform from the failed, unconstitutional statutes
struck down before. While clearly many constitutional challenges can and
will be made to Senate Bill 80 that would necessitate strict scrutiny, such a
heightened level of review is not necessary to invalidate this 2005 legislative
enactment. Because no rational basis exists to support the enactment of
Senate Bill 80, and no basis exists to distinguish Senate Bill 80 from the
unconstitutional tort reform measures of the past, Senate Bill 80 cannot
survive any constitutional challenge.
Courts have articulated little specific guidance as to the standard for

_______________________________________________________
45

Id. at 1095.
This section provides in part that “[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him
in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice
administered without denial or delay.” Ohio Const. art. I, § 16.
47
Hardy v. Vermeulen, 512 N.E.2d 626 (Ohio 1987) (holding that a four-year statute of repose for
medical malpractice action violated the Ohio constitutional right to remedy and open courts); see also
Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 639 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio 1994) (finding that a ten-year architects’ and engineers’
statute of repose for improvements to real property violated the right to remedy and open courts).
48
512 N.E.2d at 629.
49
Id. The Court proceeded to cite articles and cases discussing this issue.
50
639 N.E.2d at 430.
46
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evaluating whether a reasonably conceivable state of facts exists to support
challenged legislation, or whether the distinctions drawn by the challenged
statute are arbitrary or irrational. Yet a review of what the General
Assembly did cite as the basis for enacting Senate Bill 80 compels the
conclusion that no justification exists to deviate from binding Ohio Supreme
Court precedent invalidating tort reform. The data relied upon by the
General Assembly as its basis for enacting tort reform in 2005 exhibits none
of the characteristics required by Courts to establish minimal levels of
reliability. Indeed, in any court proceeding, judges would exclude from
evidence the data cited by the General Assembly as “junk [political]
science.”51 While constitutional law does not require the General Assembly
to provide admissible evidence supporting its enactments, when the
evidence the legislature does cite is so biased, non-scientific, and
unsubstantiated as to be completely lacking in reliability, the logical
conclusion to be drawn is that the legislation is arbitrary, unreasonable, and
has no rational basis. Particularly where, as here, the Ohio Supreme Court
has struck down virtually identical tort reform enactments, the fact that the
General Assembly can identify no new, reliable basis to overcome the prior
determinations of unconstitutionality eviscerates any presumption of
constitutionality. Instead, like the failed tort reform attempts that preceded
it, Senate Bill 80 must be held unconstitutional because it lacks a rational
basis, as is proven by a close review of the evidence and assumptions
underlying this legislation.
V.

SENATE BILL 80 BEARS NO RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP TO A
LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT INTEREST

A.

Statement of Findings and Intent Supporting Senate Bill 80

1.

The Introductory Provisions

Senate Bill 80 contains a “statement of findings and intent[,]”52
which report the basis for the legislation. The Introductory provisions are as
follows:
(A)

The General Assembly finds:
(1)
The current civil litigation system
represents a challenge to the economy of the state
of Ohio, which is dependent on business providing
essential jobs and creative innovation.
(2)

The General Assembly recognizes that a

_______________________________________________________
51
52

Dickenson v. Cardiac and Thoracic Surgery of E. Tenn., P.C., 388 F.3d 976, 982 (6th Cir. 2004).
2004 Ohio Legis. Serv. at L-1981.
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fair system of civil justice strikes an essential
balance between the rights of those who have been
legitimately harmed and the rights of those who
have been unfairly sued.
(3)
This state has a rational and legitimate state
interest in making certain that Ohio has a fair,
predictable system of civil justice that preserves the
rights of those who have been harmed by negligent
behavior, while curbing the number of frivolous
lawsuits, which increases the cost of doing
business, threatens Ohio jobs, drives up costs to
consumers, and may stifle innovation. The General
Assembly bases its findings on this state interest
upon the following evidence: . . . .53
2.

The Assumptions Implicit in the Introductory Provisions

Before reviewing the citations relied upon by the General Assembly
for its findings, it is important to review these findings closely to distill the
assumptions underlying them. In Paragraph (1), the General Assembly
presents its view that the “current civil litigation system represents a
challenge to the economy of the state of Ohio.”54 It should be noted,
however, that Senate Bill 80 does not address the civil litigation system in
the State of Ohio. To the contrary, it addresses only a select portion of the
civil litigation system – that of personal injury and property damage claims.
Other civil actions, including those “for damages for a breach of contract or
other agreement between persons” are not affected by any provisions of
Senate Bill 80.55 Therefore, as an initial matter, although the General
Assembly has identified a challenge posed by the entire civil litigation
system, it has chosen to remedy this challenge by restricting only one class
of claimants, those alleging tort injuries, while placing no restrictions on
another class of claimants, those alleging breach of contract. By
distinguishing between two classes of litigants and diminishing the ability of
one group only to obtain full relief in court, the General Assembly
arbitrarily discriminates against the class of tort claimants.56
Of further importance, note that although the General Assembly
finds that the civil justice system is a challenge to the economy, it does not

_______________________________________________________
53

Id.
Id.
55
See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.011(J) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005).
56
Cf. Ohio Const. art. I, § 2, which provides: “All political power is inherent in the people. Government
is instituted for their equal protection and benefit . . . .”
54
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find that this challenge imposes a wrongful burden on business. Just as the
highway patrol represents a challenge to reckless drivers, and the IRS
represents a challenge to tax evaders, so too the civil justice system
represents a challenge to businesses that sell unsafe products, discriminate
against employees, or defraud consumers. If businesses are challenged
because they have violated the law and are therefore forced through the civil
justice system to pay for the consequences or their actions, this challenge to
the economy would not indicate a need to reform the courts. To the
contrary, such a challenge to business would indicate that litigation is
having its desired effect of placing the onus for harm upon the party who
inflicted the injury.
Next, Paragraph (1) asserts that the State of Ohio “is dependent on
business providing essential jobs and creative innovation.”57 Thus in its
findings to justify tort reform, the Ohio General Assembly elevates the
interest of businesses in making money over the interest of individuals in
“enjoying and defending life, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property,
and seeking and obtaining happiness and safety.”58 In fact, the General
Assembly overlooks and disregards the constitutionally protected interest of
the citizens in Ohio to obtaining happiness and safety.
As to Senate Bill 80 Introductory Paragraph (2), the General
Assembly assumes that the interests of those who have been legitimately
harmed and the rights of those who have been unfairly sued present equal
concerns. Presumably, the phrase legitimately harmed represents an
awkward attempt to characterize the claims of persons who have been
harmed by another and thereby have a legitimate claim for damages. Those
unfairly sued, while undefined, would presumably be those business entities,
since the General Assembly’s only concern in reforming the justice system
is to protect businesses, that not only win lawsuits, but were unfairly
imposed upon to defend themselves in the first instance. Again, while the
Ohio Constitution specifically acknowledges the inalienable right of “[a]ll
men . . . of . . . seeking and obtaining happiness and safety,”59 no similar
concern can be located in the Ohio Constitution to protect businesses from
transaction costs in defending lawsuits. Further, in terms of sheer numbers,
the General Assembly provides no reason to believe that the number of
businesses unfairly sued in the Ohio civil justice system equates to the
number of persons who file legitimate claims for personal injury. Yet the
General Assembly seeks to balance the constitutional interest of Ohio
citizens who have legitimate claims for personal injury against the interests
of those businesses that have been unfairly sued in saving their transaction

_______________________________________________________
57

2004 Ohio Legis. Serv. at L-1981.
See Ohio Const. art. I, § 1 (containing the Bill of Rights).
59
Id.
58
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costs – a balance that denigrates the value of Ohio citizens’ constitutional
rights by equating them to a minor economic interest of business entities.
The third introductory paragraph of Senate Bill 80 states that Ohio
“has a rational and legitimate interest in making certain that Ohio has a fair,
predictable system of civil justice.”60 Curiously, the General Assembly
introduces the word predictable to describe its goal for the civil justice
system. Yet requiring predictability in the context of ascertaining damages
for harm caused to tort victims provides businesses the opportunity to
quantify their potential exposure, then weigh the expense of paying for harm
versus the expense of avoiding unsafe conduct. Just as the Ford Company’s
actuaries did in regard to the Pinto fuel tanks,61 businesses in Ohio could
calculate whether it is cheaper to injure consumers or make safe products.
Such predictability does not promote the constitutional right of Ohio citizens
to obtain happiness and safety. To the contrary, predictability in damages
hinders safety by providing an option for businesses to put profits ahead of
safety.
Introductory Paragraph (3) further discusses “preserv[ing] the rights
of those who have been harmed by negligent behavior.”62 This reference to
negligent behavior merits close attention because Senate Bill 80 affects all
tort claims, not just those based on negligent conduct. On one extreme,
Senate Bill 80 protects intentional tortfeasors such as child molesters,
arsonists, and drunk drivers, by capping their exposure for punitive damages
and capping their liability for pain and suffering caused by their intentional
acts. Similarly, businesses that choose to intentionally sell harmful
products, or engage in intentional misrepresentation and defraud consumers,
are also protected by Senate Bill 80. Further, Senate Bill 80 also purports to
abrogate common law negligence claims based on harm caused by products
and limit claims in such cases to those based on strict products liability.
Thus, the statement that Senate Bill 80 is intended to protect the rights of
those harmed by negligent behavior does not coincide with the scope of
Senate Bill 80, which limits remedies available to the entire gambit of
personal injury tort claimants, including those harmed by intentional
misconduct.
Next, Introductory Paragraph (3) discusses the curbing of “frivolous
lawsuits,” a term which the General Assembly does not define.63 Moreover,
the General Assembly fails to provide any connection between capping
damages awarded in meritorious personal injury cases and the stifling of

_______________________________________________________
60

2004 Ohio Legis. Serv. at L-1981.
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1981).
62
2004 Ohio Legis. Serv. at L-1981.
63
Id.
61
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frivolous lawsuits. Using similar logic, the legislature could mandate that
medical treatment available to terminally ill patients will be arbitrarily
limited in order to discourage doctor visits by hypochondriacs. The General
Assembly cannot articulate a rational basis for requiring that its remedy for
the alleged flaws in the civil justice system be borne by those tort victims
who have suffered the greatest damages and who have proven the merits of
their claims.
Further undercutting the entire basis of assumptions contained in the
findings of the General Assembly is the presumption that Senate Bill 80 will
have the effect of “curbing the number of frivolous lawsuits, which
increases [sic] the cost of doing business, threatens Ohio jobs, drives up
costs to consumers, and may stifle innovation,” all of which the General
Assembly identifies as important state interests.64 The presumption that tort
reform legislation will promote business activity in Ohio stems from a
fundamental misunderstanding of choice of law principles. Clearly, the
legislature is presuming that by limiting the ability of Ohio citizens to sue
for personal injury and property damages they have suffered through such
mechanisms as caps on damages, statutes of repose, and other legal hurdles,
Ohio businesses and the Ohio economy will benefit as a result.
Senate Bill 80, however, does not protect Ohio businesses; instead,
Senate Bill 80 harms Ohio citizens. Under choice of law principles, courts
apply the tort law of the place where the injury occurred or the state with the
most relationship to the events, not the law of the state where the business is
located. Senate Bill 80 therefore provides no benefit whatsoever to
businesses located in Ohio, even those headquartered in Ohio, if they sell
harmful products that injure consumers – unless they are fortunate enough to
injure a consumer from Ohio. Instead, Senate Bill 80 prohibits injured Ohio
citizens from being awarded full damages to compensate them for injuries
caused by any tortfeasors, whether the tortfeasors are from New Jersey,
Japan, or California, or if they happen to be from Ohio.
Therefore, the General Assembly bases Senate Bill 80 on an
erroneous fundamental assumption. The General Assembly mistakenly
assumes that by limiting tort damages, it will protect businesses located in
Ohio or encourage new businesses to relocate to Ohio. In so reasoning, the
General Assembly simply misunderstands the impact of Senate Bill 80 on
the rights of Ohio tort victims and misunderstands the application of conflict
of laws principles. Senate Bill 80 limits remedies of every tort victim in
Ohio, regardless of the location of the business defendant.
Thus, the impact of Senate Bill 80 is to leave Ohio citizens who
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suffer personal injury or property damage with an inadequate remedy at law
that denies them compensation for their full damages, in order to protect
business defendants. The protected business defendants need not be located
in Ohio, but instead can literally be citizens of any other state or any foreign
country. As a result, the State of Ohio, its citizens, and its taxpayers bear
the burden of coping with uncompensated harm, while foreign business
entities benefit by escaping responsibility for the damages they have caused
to Ohio citizens.
3.

The Evidence Cited by the General Assembly

a.

The National Bureau of Economic Research Study65

As its first piece of evidence supporting the rationale for Senate Bill
80, the General Assembly cites a study entitled: “The Causes and Effects of
Liability Reform: Some Empirical Evidence.”66 The Working Papers are
simply individual reports or studies submitted by The National Bureau of
Economic Research (“NBER”) researchers.67 NBER makes no claim to
conduct peer review before distributing these papers.68 According to the
NBER website: “Nearly 700 NBER Working Papers are published each
year, and many subsequently appear in scholarly journals.”69 Therefore, by
implication, NBER Working Papers should not be confused with scholarly
publications.
Nor does the NBER Working Paper relied upon by the General
Assembly present other indicia of reliability. The authors state their purpose
as follows:
We provide empirical evidence both on the causes and
effects of liability reforms. Using a newly collected data set
of state tort laws and a panel data set containing industrylevel data by state for the years 1969-1990, we (1) identify
the characteristics of states that are associated with liability
reforms and (2) examine whether liability reforms influence
productivity and employment.70
However, if one wishes to examine the list of states relied upon by the
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authors to see how each state is classified in terms of having enacted tort
reform, a review of the paper indicates that no such list exists. Thus while
the authors claim in Appendix A of the report, under the heading “Sources
of Data,” that they “obtained information on liability reforms from state
statutes and judicial decisions,” and state further that “Appendix C lists the
reforms by state and adoption date,”71 the Working Paper in fact contains no
Appendix C.
Because this Working Paper contains no evidence to explain which
states it considered to be in the tort reform camp and which were not, it is
impossible to determine the reliability of the conclusions in the paper. For
example, did the study authors properly interpret state law, and consider not
only whether statutes were enacted, but also whether they were held
unconstitutional, or repealed, or amended? If a state enacted tort reform
legislation in 1984 and its highest court struck down the legislation as
unconstitutional in 1988, is that state considered to be a pro-tort reform state
or a non-tort reform state by the study authors? The only means by which
the reliability of the authors’ conclusions can be assessed is by reviewing
the exhibit, Appendix C to the article, which purports to categorize each
state. The fact that the authors specifically reference Appendix C, but the
Appendix does not exist, demolishes any presumption of reliability for this
report. In fact, the inability to replicate the results of the study has been
recognized by courts as a factor to reject data as unreliable.72
Moreover, the authors’ conclusion from the study, even if it were
derived from reliable data, provides no basis for the General Assembly to
act. The authors state:
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that
reductions in liability from the current common-law levels
improve efficiency. However, the results are also consistent
with three other alternative hypotheses.73
They continue to explain that the results could be due to other factors, such
as public policy or economic issues which they failed to control for in their
analysis.74
Therefore, in relying upon this report, the General Assembly cites as
a basis for upsetting 200 years of common law a flawed study, which is not
peer reviewed, has no indicia of reliability, omits referenced data, and
reaches a conclusion that can be due to any of four different factors.
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Moreover, the authors base their analysis on national data from 1969
through 1990,75 providing scant relevance to Ohio law in 2005, and no basis
for disregarding Ohio Supreme Court precedent from 1999.
b.

The 2002 Study by the White House Council of Economic
Advisors76

The Council of Economic Advisors (“CEA”) consists of three
members appointed by the President, who are to assist the President in
developing economic policy.77 As such, the CEA consists of political
appointees who serve to advance the economic policy of the current
administration. The 2002 White House CEA publication cited by the
General Assembly in support of Senate Bill 80 advances the policies of the
George W. Bush administration. As with the NBER report, the CEA report
has not been subject to peer review, nor is it published in a scholarly journal.
For that matter, the 2002 report is not a study at all. Instead, the document,
which is available on the CEA website, is described as a “CEA White
Paper.”78 A white paper is generally understood to be a position or policy
paper of an organization. As such, white papers do not purport to represent
an objective review of empirical data.
The 2002 CEA White Paper (“White Paper”) cited by the General
Assembly “pursues th[e] analogy between inefficient tort litigation and
taxes, and examines the question of ‘who pays’ for excessive tort costs.”79
The White Paper concludes that the tort system generates a “‘tort tax’
[which] is ultimately borne by individuals through higher prices, reduced
wages, or decreased investment returns.”80 The White Paper estimates the
amount of this tax as the equivalent of a 2% tax on consumption, a 3% tax
on wages, or a 5% tax on capital income.81
Before examining the basis for the conclusions in the CEA White
Paper, it cannot be overlooked that, obviously, no American actually pays a
tort tax. Instead, the depiction of the alleged costs of litigation as a tort tax
represents a public relations spin intended to create a negative impression of
the American justice system. Again, for the General Assembly to cite such
hyperbole as the basis for fundamental changes in the rights of Ohio citizens
must raise serious doubts as to the bona fide need for action by the General
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Assembly.
In regard to the data discussed in the White Paper, none of it is
specific to Ohio. Instead, the White Paper takes a sweeping view of national
trends in tort liability and economic costs. Further, the White Paper does
not distinguish between tort cases involving businesses and those involving
medical malpractice tort claims. To the contrary, the White Paper
specifically includes in its discussion repeated references to the alleged
effects of tort liability on medical practice,82 “doctors deciding not to
practice certain specialties or in particular communities for fear of being
sued,” and the “practice of ‘defensive medicine.’”83 Senate Bill 80,
however, does not encompass claims alleging medical malpractice because
the Ohio General Assembly passed separate legislation concerning medical
claims.84 Yet the General Assembly nonetheless relies upon this national
data incorporating medical malpractice statistics to establish its alleged need
for altering the justice system for non-medical malpractice claims in Ohio.
Because the data discussed in the CEA White Paper is not specific to Ohio
and is not specific to non-medical malpractice tort claims, the White Paper
cannot provide a logical basis for passage of Senate Bill 80.
The White Paper bases its analysis upon the Tillinghast-Towers
Perrin Report,85 which the General Assembly also cites separately as an
independent basis for enacting Senate Bill 80. As a result, the General
Assembly relies twice on the same source, Tillinghast-Towers Perrin. Then,
by adopting figures from Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, the CEA White Paper
contends that U.S. tort costs are 1.8% of the Gross Domestic Product.86 The
authors then jump one step further, calculating the “litigation tax” created by
“‘excessive’ tort costs”87 in the United States tort system.88
In addition to the unreliability of the data upon which the White
Paper is based, the White Paper contains an obvious flaw in the
methodology by which the alleged tort tax is calculated. Specifically, the
White Paper contends that the alleged cost of the tort system can be
calculated as a percentage of the “total wage and salary disbursements to
private industries (i.e., excluding government workers).”89 Yet the costs of
the tort system certainly include tort claims brought by persons who are
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government workers, unemployed persons, children, and retirees.
Therefore, the calculation that tort claims equate to a 2.1% tax of wage and
salary for private sector workers90 represents a deliberate distortion in which
the authors attempt to assess the cost of the exercise of a constitutional right
by the entire citizenry of the United States upon the earnings of private
sector employees.
Finally, the conclusion of the White Paper that “the cost of the
litigation tax is also far more than enough money to solve Social Security’s
long-term financing crisis”91 represents an absurd confusion of issues that
underscores the political motivation behind the paper. Such a biased
persuasion piece cannot qualify as a rational basis to alter fundamental
constitutional rights of Ohio citizens to trial by jury.
c.

The 2003 Harris Poll of 928 Senior Corporate Attorneys92

At least the 2003 Harris Poll, entitled “State Liability Systems
Ranking Study,”93 which was conducted for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
and U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, does not pretend to be
objective or scientific. It consists of a survey (“Survey”) of “928 senior
corporate attorneys” to “explore how reasonable and fair the tort liability
system is perceived to be by Corporate America.”94 One conclusion of the
Survey is that “an overwhelming 82% report that the litigation environment
in a state could affect important business decisions at their company, such as
where to locate or do business.”95
Apparently, one can conclude from this Survey that in-house
counsel share the General Assembly’s lack of understanding of choice-oflaw principles. Beyond that, the Survey reflects the perceptions of in-house
corporate counsel as to which states’ court systems are more favorable to
business interests. The authors warn: “While these findings only reflect the
perceptions of in-house general counsel or other senior litigators from
corporate America . . . , W. I. Thomas once noted that, ‘Those things that
are believed to be real are real in their consequences.’”96
Apparently the General Assembly finds such Chicken Little logic
persuasive, but others would agree that this survey hardly rises to the level
of a rational basis to upend the Ohio legal system. In fact, despite the
author’s disclaimer of a valid factual basis, the Ohio General Assembly
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actually relies upon this Survey of biased, interested parties, which purports
to measure in-house counsel’s perception of reality, as its basis for altering
the civil justice system in Ohio. The General Assembly, acting upon the
speculative opinions of partisans rather than demanding reliable proven
facts, shocks and upsets any presumption of rationality on the part of the
General Assembly in enacting Senate Bill 80.
d.

The Tillinghast-Towers Perrin 2003 Study97

Like the other reports cited by the General Assembly, the report
authored by Tillinghast-Towers Perrin is not published in a peer reviewed
scholarly journal, nor is it prepared by a non-partisan to the tort reform
debate. To the contrary, as described on its website, “The Tillinghast
business of Towers Perrin provides consulting and software solutions to
insurance and financial services companies and advises other organizations
on risk financing and self-insurance. We help our clients improve business
performance in areas related to their financial, risk, product, distribution and
capital issues.”98 In describing the reports available on its website, the
company states: “Tillinghast provides clients around the world with
published research and viewpoints on industry issues.”99 To be clear, the
published research is published through its availability on the Internet, not
through scholarly, peer reviewed journals. Further, the studies, including
the “U.S. Tort Costs: 2003 Update”100 and the 2004 Update,101 have no
acknowledged individual authors, but rather are identified as being prepared
by the consulting firm.
The 2003 Tillinghast report claims that the rate of annual increases
in “tort system costs” was by far the lowest for the decade of the 1990s – at
3.3%, compared to rates of 11.6% for the 1950s, 9.8% for the 1960s, 11.9%
for the 1970s, and 11.7% for the 1980s.102 It then reports anomalous results
for 2001 and 2002 of 14.4% and 13.3% increases, which it claims are based
on factors including: “record jury awards in medical malpractice cases,”103
increases in shareholder lawsuits, inflation in medical care costs for injured
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victims, and “increases in class action lawsuits and large claim awards.”104
No data is cited to support these presumptions.
Interestingly, by the next year, in its U.S. Tort Costs: 2004 Update,
Tillinghast reports: “U.S. tort costs grew by 5.4% in 2003, representing a
dramatic reduction from the double-digit trends experienced in 2001 and
2002.”105 Thus it appears that the General Assembly jumped to alter the
entire civil justice system based on two years worth of data, ignoring trends
over five decades that indicated a consistent, and in fact a declining, rate of
increase in the costs of the tort claims.106
Further, as with the other data cited by the General Assembly as the
basis for tort reform, the 2003 Tillinghast report presents nationwide data
that is not specific to Ohio. In fact, the data analyzed by Tillinghast is not
limited to tort actions as defined by the General Assembly, that is, claims
based on damages to person or property, excluding medical malpractice.
Instead, the Tillinghast report includes in its calculations the alleged cost of
medical malpractice in presenting its data on trends in the costs of tort
cases.107
In addition, the Tillinghast report indicates that the alleged 20012002 spike in tort claims is based not only upon increases in medical
malpractice litigation, but states that it is also due to increases in other types
of litigation clearly not encompassed by Senate Bill 80, such as Enron type
claims “against the boards of directors of publicly traded companies,
reflecting poor stock performance and further exacerbated more recently by
corporate accounting scandals and general consumer mistrust of U.S.
corporations.”108 Shareholder claims of this nature were not addressed by
the General Assembly’s actions in capping noneconomic damages,109 nor
were they addressed by the General Assembly’s cap on punitive damages in
products liability cases,110 or its enactment of a ten year statute of repose for
product liability cases.111
The Tillinghast report also cites increases in the cost of medical care
as a cause for an increase in jury verdict awards.112 Yet the General
Assembly places no limits on economic damages in passing Senate Bill 80,
so this factor too has no rational relationship to the alleged defects in the
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civil justice system in Ohio, which the General Assembly contends to be
addressing.
As with the other reports cited by the General Assembly, the
underlying data relied upon in the Tillinghast report remains a mystery. For
example, Tillinghast reports and the General Assembly parrot:
The cost of the United States tort system grew at a record
rate in 2001, according to a February 2003 study published
by Tillinghast-Towers Perrin. The system, however, failed
to return even fifty cents for every dollar to people who
were injured. Tillinghast-Towers Perrin also found that
fifty-four per cent [sic] of the total cost accounted for
attorney’s fees, both for plaintiffs and defendants, and
administration. Only twenty-two per cent [sic] of the tort
system’s cost was used directly to reimburse people for
economic damages associated with injuries and losses they
sustain.113
As noted by many commentators, these percentages quoted in the
Tillinghast report are both undocumented and misleading. First, the
Tillinghast report includes in its analysis of the total cost of tort litigation
not only the amount paid to claimants for their damages and the amount
allocated to their attorneys for fees, but also includes defense attorney fees
and expenses, handling costs for insurance company claims, and an
“administrative, or overhead, component.”114 This administrative, or
overhead, cost refers to internal expenses of insurance companies to do
business.115 No source for any of these figures is ever cited. Clearly,
Tillinghast deliberately mischaracterizes the analysis of the percentage
recovered by claimants in tort cases by portraying defense costs and
insurance company overhead as part of the costs from which tort claimants
are paid.
If the defense and insurance costs are excluded, the Tillinghast
figures actually demonstrate that the total amount awarded in tort cases
nationwide for economic loss equals 34%, noneconomic loss equals 38%,
and claimant attorney fees equals 27% of total awards.116 Further, the
amount awarded to claimants equals 72% of total recovery, compared to
27% for attorneys’ fees. These figures present quite a different portrayal
than the deliberately misleading statement by Tillinghast, quoted by the
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General Assembly that “[t]he system, however, failed to return even fifty
cents for every dollar to people who were injured.”117 Further, the statement
quoted by the General Assembly, that “[o]nly twenty-two per cent of the tort
system’s cost was used directly to reimburse people for the economic
damages associated with injuries and losses they sustain,”118 must be
contrasted with the fact that claimants recovered 72% of the total amounts
awarded, of which 34% reflected economic recovery and 38% reflected
noneconomic damages.
The General Assembly further quotes figures for the increase in
costs alleged by the Tillinghast report of 14.3% in 2001, “the highest
increase since 1986,”119 while disregarding that its calculation for the
increase in tort costs for the decade of 1991-2000 was 3.3%,120 the lowest
amount in any decade studied, and disregarding that Tillinghast attributed
the increase in 2001 and 2002 to multiple factors largely unrelated to the
issues addressed by Senate Bill 80.121 The General Assembly also claims
that the cost of the tort system grew in 2001 at a rate “greatly exceeding
overall economic growth of two and six tenth[s] per cent [sic],”122 again
ignoring 50 years of previous data, and ignoring the many factors that
contributed to the collapse of the economy in 2001, wholly unrelated to tort
issues.
The General Assembly concludes its discussion of the Tillinghast
data with the statement that the costs of the United States tort system is
“equal to a five per cent [sic] tax on wages.”123 No such data, however, is
contained in the Tillinghast report, and the basis for this claim by the
General Assembly cannot be determined.
e.

Testimony of Bruce Johnson, Director of the Ohio
Department of Development

The General Assembly quotes figures concerning United States tort
costs based upon testimony by Bruce Johnson, Director of the Ohio
Mr. Johnson’s testimony, however,
Department of Development.124
indicates he too is merely quoting from Tillinghast-Towers Perrin. Thus, of
the three different alleged sources of information from the General
Assembly concerning statistics of tort costs, all are derived from the
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin report, which has no verifiable basis to confirm
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the reliability of the data presented. In addition, he cites facts and figures,
such as “one out of three small businesses [in Ohio] has been sued,” with no
basis in the record whatsoever.125 Nor does he disclose whether these
businesses were sued in personal injury actions, or for such matters as
breach of contract or other business related disputes. In short, Mr. Johnson
presents an argument devoid of reliable data.
Mr. Johnson further testifies that alleged tort costs “put Ohio
businesses at a disadvantage vis-á-vis foreign competition and are not
helpful to development.”126 Once again, Mr. Johnson and the General
Assembly confuse the concept of limiting damages available to injured
victims from Ohio with the concept of protecting Ohio businesses. As
previously discussed, under choice of law principles, Ohio businesses and
foreign businesses alike enjoy equal protection under Senate Bill 80 for
harm they inflict upon Ohio citizens, courtesy of Senate Bill 80’s tort
reform. There is no extra protection, however, under Senate Bill 80 for
businesses located in Ohio. Instead, under Senate Bill 80, both Ohio and
foreign corporations may harm Ohio citizens with impunity, and both will
be equally protected by damages caps that prohibit the most seriously
injured Ohio citizens from obtaining the full recovery to which they prove
they are entitled.127
Mr. Johnson also cites anecdotal evidence regarding the closure of
an Owens Corning plant in Ohio and the resulting loss of 275 jobs, which he
alleges is due to the bankruptcy of the parent corporation from asbestos
liability.128 No evidence is offered, however, to support this claim, or to
explain why the plant would not have been sold in the bankruptcy
proceedings and operated by a new owner if it had economic value.
Moreover, it appears that Mr. Johnson’s concern for Owens Corning
workers does not extend to worrying about their health. He asserts that the
bankruptcy of asbestos manufacturers cost 65,000 jobs in Ohio and around
the world,129 but he makes no reference to the number of people who died in
Ohio and around the world from exposure to asbestos manufactured by
Owens Corning and other companies. Nor does he consider whether Ohio
citizens are well protected by promoting corporations that produce products
fatal to their workers and fatal to consumers. In short, he generalizes from a
national crisis caused by the actions of the asbestos manufacturers in
deliberately exposing their employees and consumers to a defective and
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dangerous product, which the courts and Congress have addressed for
decades, as a basis to suddenly impose artificial limits on all personal injury
tort claims by Ohio citizens in 2004.
While Mr. Johnson bemoans the anti-competitive dilemma for Ohio
businesses, according to reports of the government agency he then headed,
the Ohio Department of Development, Ohio’s economy ranks third in the
United States for Manufacturing and Durable Goods.130 Further, the Ohio
Department of Development raves that if Ohio were a separate country, its
economy would rate 25th in the world.131 The testimony of Mr. Johnson,
therefore, appears unreliable, and is contradicted by data generated by his
own state agency.
f.

Laments about Punitive Damages.

The General Assembly recites generalizations about the dilemma of
punitive damages, without citation to any specific testimony or evidence to
support its claims.132 The General Assembly does not name a single
instance in which the alleged dilemma of “occasional multiple punitive
damages awards” has ever occurred in Ohio, nor does the General Assembly
cite a single situation in Ohio in which punitive damages were allegedly
awarded in an excessive or inappropriate amount.133 Further, the General
Assembly acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court has rendered
opinions that set parameters on the award of punitive damages.134
The General Assembly also attempts to justify the distinction
contained in Senate Bill 80 regarding the amount of punitive damages that
can be awarded based upon the number of employees of the wrongdoing
employer.135 Yet this distinction has no rational basis to the state’s goal of
deterring deliberate misconduct by corporations, inasmuch as the number of
employees has no relationship to the profits realized through reckless acts.
In short, the punitive damages discussion is nothing but rhetoric with no
evidence, and provides no basis whatsoever for the legislature to undermine
Ohio tort law.
g.

Statutes of Repose.

In regard to its discussion of statutes of repose, the only evidence
cited by the General Assembly to support the statute of repose relates to
liability for architects, engineers and constructors of improvements to real
property, which is the testimony of Jack Pottmeyer, architect and managing
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principal of MKC Associates, Inc.136 Mr. Pottmeyer complains about his
firm being named as a defendant in a lawsuit involving injuries sustained
from a fall off a platform that the firm had designed 23 years prior, which
ultimately resulted in the victim’s death.137 He contends that members of his
profession bear an unfair burden because they have to buy professional
liability “claims made” insurance polices to cover claims which may be
based upon buildings designed in prior decades.138 Citing only this single
piece of anecdotal evidence, the Ohio General Assembly enacted a ten-year
statute of repose.139
The General Assembly determines that “because the useful life of an
improvement to real property may be substantially longer than ten years
after the completion of the construction of the improvement, it is an
unacceptable burden to require the maintenance of those types of records
and other documentation for a period in excess of ten years after that
completion.”140 Yet the General Assembly protects the right of these same
architects and builders to file breach of written contract claims for a period
fifteen years from the date of the breach.141 Similarly, architects can enjoy
copyright protection for their designs for the duration of their lives plus
seventy years after their date of death.142 Furthermore, the General
Assembly cites no evidence that enactment of a ten-year statute of repose
will result in savings in insurance premiums for architects and contractors.
In the similar situation involving medical malpractice, premiums paid by
physicians did not diminish when tort reform became effective.143
Thus, based on a single episode of an allegedly unfair claim,144 the
Ohio General Assembly nullifies the legal right of every Ohio citizen to file
a lawsuit for injuries related to negligent design of buildings and
improvements to real property. Inasmuch as the expected life of buildings
and improvements to real property far exceeds the ten-year period selected
by the legislature, and no data existed in 2003 that differed from the
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evidence before the Ohio Supreme Court in Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co.,145 the
General Assembly simply does not supply a rational basis for enacting a
change in the statute of repose for building and construction improvements.
Then based solely upon this testimony by a single architect, and
without citation to any testimony or proof concerning consumer products,
the General Assembly similarly insulates all product manufacturers from
liability for any claims brought more than ten years after delivery of any
product.146 Once again, the General Assembly announces that “more than
ten years after a product has been delivered, it is very difficult for a
manufacturer or supplier to locate reliable evidence and witnesses regarding
the design, production, or marketing of the product, thus severely
disadvantaging manufacturers or suppliers in their efforts to defend actions
based on a product[s] liability claim.”147 Yet these same manufacturers
appear to have no problems filing lawsuits to protect their patents for a
period of 20 years.148 The assertions of the General Assembly are simply
specious, and in fact do not even appear to be a serious attempt to justify the
need for the legislation.
h.

Noneconomic Damages Caps

The General Assembly states: “While pain and suffering awards are
inherently subjective, it is believed that this inflation of noneconomic
damages is partially due to the improper consideration of evidence of
wrongdoing in assessing pain and suffering damages.”149 What inflation?
No inflation of noneconomic damages has been established in the record
cited by the General Assembly. Without a shred of evidence, and without
even a prior discussion, the General Assembly invents this inflation of
noneconomic damages, which becomes a problem in need of a remedy. In
fact, the only report cited that refers to the amounts of damages awarded, the
Tillinghast report, notes that economic damages have increased due to
increasing medical costs.150 But no data is cited to even suggest that an
increase in noneconomic damages is an issue. Undeterred, the General
Assembly declares that evidence of punitive conduct has caused an increase
in awards for noneconomic damages.151 Once again, the General Assembly
cites not one iota of evidence to support either the observation (inflation in
noneconomic damages), or the alleged cause (improper consideration of
evidence of wrong doing). The entire discussion is but a fabrication without
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citation.
Based upon this assumption of a problem and the speculation of a
cause for the assumed problem, the General Assembly enacts limitations
upon the introduction of evidence by the courts, instructs the courts on
requirements for bifurcation of trials, and requires courts to “rigorously
review pain and suffering awards to ensure that they properly serve
compensatory purposes and are not excessive.”152 Similarly, the General
Assembly claims that twenty-one states have modified or abolished the
collateral source rule, but makes no findings as to why Ohio should consider
doing the same.153 The General Assembly also requests that the Supreme
Court overturn its prior holdings in which it repeatedly struck down prior
identical tort reform measures.154 Thus, the General Assembly assumes that
it possesses more expertise in operating courts than do the judges
responsible for the court system, and then proceeds to insert the legislature
into the operations of the judicial branch of Ohio government.
B.
1.

Applying the Court Mandated Reliability Standards to the
General Assembly’s Analysis
The Court’s Gatekeeper Function

The General Assembly alleges that the civil justice system in Ohio
unfairly harms business interests.155 In enacting Senate Bill 80, the General
Assembly presumes the need to repair the Ohio civil justice system and that
Senate Bill 80 provides an appropriate remedy. To determine whether a
rational basis for Senate Bill 80 exists, the evidence cited by the General
Assembly to claim that Ohio courts are in crisis and that Senate Bill 80 will
fairly cure the dilemma should be reviewed with the same degree of scrutiny
courts use in reviewing other opinion evidence.
That is, the
recommendations of the Ohio General Assembly should be scrutinized
under the standards adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.156 and its progeny to determine
whether the General Assembly acted with a rational basis in passing Senate
Bill 80. Under Daubert, the Courts have developed clear criteria for
determining whether evidence is reliable.157 If the evidence cited by the
General Assembly and the assumptions drawn from this evidence fail to
meet threshold reliability standards, then the evidence cannot be considered
adequate to establish a rational basis for Senate Bill 80 under constitutional
law.
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Daubert Requires Expert Opinion to be Based on Reliable
Evidence

In scrutinizing opinion testimony, the United States Supreme Court
requires that: (1) it be based upon sufficient facts or data; (2) it be the
product of reliable principles and methods; and (3) the principles and
methods be applied reliably to the facts.158 Courts hold that the “reliability
analysis applies to all aspects of an expert’s testimony: the methodology, the
facts underlying the expert’s opinion, the link between the facts and the
conclusion.”159 This link between the facts and conclusions is sometimes
referred to as “fit[],” that is an inquiry as to whether the evidence fits the
testimony.160
In addition, the qualifications of the expert must also be
considered.161 Not only may the level of expertise or specific qualifications
of the expert opinion affect the reliability of the expert’s opinion, but also
bias on the part of the expert may render the opinion suspect under Daubert.
Courts consider with great caution opinions reached only after an expert has
been retained by a partisan to the dispute.162 Similarly, the legislature
should consider with caution data generated solely by a partisan with a
direct interest in the outcome of the legislative debate.
It is accepted that “any step that renders the analysis unreliable
under the Daubert factors renders the expert’s testimony inadmissible.”163
The factors to be considered in determining the reliability under Daubert
include: (1) whether the theory has been empirically studied or tested and
the nature of the methodology used; (2) whether the theory or technique has
been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known and potential
rate of error; and (4) whether the theory or technique enjoys general
acceptance within the relevant professional community.164 Each of these
factors provides reassurance that the evidence is reliable, and that the
evidence does not reflect arbitrary or irrational results. Similarly, courts
identify publication in a peer reviewed journal as a critical means of
assessing reliability. “[P]ublication (or lack thereof) in a peer reviewed
journal . . . will be a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in
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assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology
upon which an opinion is premised.”165
Courts also review whether the expert has considered other possible
explanations when rendering causation opinions. For example, in In re
Paoli, the Third Circuit held that when an expert reaches a conclusion based
upon a differential diagnosis but fails to consider other plausible causes,
“that doctor’s methodology is unreliable.”166 Similarly, in Heller the court
found that an opinion on causation lacked reliable methodology when the
expert failed to articulate good grounds for excluding other plausible
causes.167 Applying this standard to evidence relied upon by the legislature
indicates that if the legislature accepts conclusions in data without
considering and eliminating other plausible causes for an observed effect,
then the legislature’s conclusions cannot be considered to have a rational
basis.
Another important factor under Daubert is the ability to replicate
the results of any research. In other words, the data analyzed and the
methodology employed should be presented clearly so that their reliability
can be confirmed through independent means.168 Methodologies must be
validated by accepted scientific standards.169
Anecdotal evidence,
suppositions, and assumptions alone cannot be considered sufficient or
reliable as a basis for opinion under Daubert.170 If the legislature relies
upon evidence which lacks the necessary transparency and supporting
documentation, then the conclusions drawn from that data must be
considered arbitrary due to an inability to confirm or replicate the
underlying information.
3.

Applying the Daubert Criteria to the Evidence Cited by the
General Assembly

Not one piece of data cited by the General Assembly passes the
admissibility requirements of the United States Supreme Court under
Daubert. To the contrary, the data cited by the General Assembly could
serve as a model of unreliable evidence. As a result of the unreliable
evidence and unsupported conclusions drawn from the data by the General
Assembly, Senate Bill 80 must be held arbitrary, unreasonable and lacking
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in any rational basis.
First, none of the reports cited by the General Assembly appear in a
peer reviewed journal. Far from it. The reports, if published at all, are
published on the Internet at the websites of partisans to the tort reform
debate, or on the websites of politically affiliated organizations. For
example, the NBER study is available only on the Internet, purports to
analyze the characteristics of states that have enacted tort reform legislation,
and is not peer reviewed.171 The Tillinghast-Towers Perrin report is by a
consulting firm to the insurance industry, and the report appears on its web
site of white papers on various insurance industry topics and is not peer
reviewed.172 In fact, its authors are not identified, but just the firm
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin. Similarly, the CEA report is titled a White
Paper, was prepared by a politically appointed council acting as the
economic advisors to the White House, and is available on its website along
with articles advocating changes in the Social Security system.173 It is not
peer reviewed. The final report cited by the General Assembly, the Harris
Poll of In-House Counsel, conducted for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
and the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, also is not peer reviewed,
is available on the Internet, and can only be described as unscientific and
intentionally biased.174
Further, the data upon which these studies are based and the
methodology employed by the authors cannot be understood. The NBER
report omits Appendix C, which reportedly identifies which states it
considered to be tort reform states and which it did not. Therefore, the
analysis can never be confirmed nor reproduced because the data upon
which it is based is not apparent. Similarly, the Tillinghast report omits any
reference for its data. The calculations of tort costs, the amounts allocated
to economic and noneconomic damages, the amounts paid for plaintiffs’
fees and expenses, the amounts paid in defense costs and claims
administration, the amounts paid in insurance company overhead, and the
annual increases and decreases in costs of the tort system have no
identifiable basis from which the data can be verified. Similarly, the
methodology used by Tillinghast and CEA to calculate the tort tax has never
been validated as appropriate in any peer reviewed publication. The Harris
Poll does not even trouble to pretend to present scientific findings. Instead,
it concludes that perceptions may become real; thus the antithesis of a
conclusion based upon reliable data or susceptible to verification of
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results.175
The NBER report concedes that the alleged results of the effects of
tort reform in each state could be due to “three other alternative
hypotheses.”176 Yet, the General Assembly disregards these alternative
hypotheses and assumes without a basis that the report forms a basis for tort
reform. Such a failure to exclude alternative causes renders an opinion
unreliable under Daubert.177 Similarly, in Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, the
authors cite other alleged causes for the alleged increase in tort costs in 2001
and 2002.178 These factors include increases in the size of medical
malpractice verdicts, increases in shareholder litigation, and increases in
medical care costs.179 Three of these factors have no relevance to Senate
Bill 80, which excludes medical malpractice and contains no caps on
economic damages. As to the fourth factor, alleging an increase in reserves
by insurance companies based upon projections for asbestos claims, such an
increase in reserves does not establish an increase in tort claims actually
paid in 2001 and 2002. Further, the unique nature of the asbestos saga and
the widespread harm to workers nationwide, due to decades of exposure to
products that the manufacturers knew would cause deadly illness, cannot be
generalized into a crisis facing Ohio in 2001 and 2002 which necessitates
limiting tort remedies for all other claimants.
In fact, it cannot be overlooked that regardless of its source, none of
the objective data quoted in the articles cited by the General Assembly is
specific to Ohio, or even contains figures that can be extrapolated as
applying to Ohio. Only the Harris Poll of In-House Counsel makes any
specific reference to Ohio, which is generally ranked in the middle of the
states on most questions. Instead, the articles quote national figures, which
also include medical malpractice and other tort claims not subject to Senate
Bill 80 in Ohio. Thus under the Daubert criteria of fit, the General
Assembly fails to cite evidence to support its assumptions in Senate Bill 80.
The only Ohio-specific evidence cited by the General Assembly is
the testimony of the architect, Mr. Pottmeyer, who does not want to be
burdened with purchasing insurance or defending lawsuits for buildings he
has designed, and the testimony of Mr. Johnson of the Ohio Department of
Development. The single story Mr. Pottmeyer recites of a lawsuit involving
his firm cannot be considered a reliable basis to conclude that the entire
system of civil justice in Ohio must be overhauled. A single piece of
anecdotal evidence, supposition, or assumption unsupported by any
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reproducible, verifiable data, cannot be considered a reliable basis for
forming a conclusion.180 The legislature’s determination based on this
single, one-sided piece of testimony that the claims of every Ohio citizen
must be forever extinguished if related to products or events more than ten
years old, arbitrarily degrades the constitutional rights of the entire
population of Ohio citizens with no rational or objective basis.
The testimony of Mr. Johnson of the Ohio Department of
Development, in which he contends that tort reform is needed to improve
economic competitiveness of Ohio, stands directly contradicted by his own
Departmental Report, which indicates that Ohio’s economy ranks seventh in
the United States181 and would be 25th in the world if it were an independent
country.182 In terms of reliability, the Report prepared by his department,
entitled Ohio’s Gross State Product, March 2005, is a well-documented
governmental publication by a state agency authorized to generate such
reports. Significantly, the source of the data quoted in the Report is clearly
indicated in each chart and graph generated by the Agency and contained
within the Report. Mr. Johnson’s testimony, on the other hand, represents
his unsubstantiated opinion, in which he recites facts and figures with no
identifiable basis, or which are based on flawed national data. For instance,
Mr. Johnson cites no source for his claim that one in three small businesses
in Ohio has been sued, nor does he state whether the lawsuits involve tort
claims as opposed to business litigation.183 He also quotes an unidentified
survey in which “more than half of business owners” claim they would “go
out of business if a lawsuit cost them more than $250,000 in legal fees and
costs.”184 Such undocumented speculation cannot be confused with reliable
evidence. Further, Mr. Johnson repeatedly cites the Tillinghast-Towers
Perrin report, with its mystical calculation of a national tort tax on workers,
for which no reliable basis or reproducible methodology is provided.
Testimony based on non-disclosed sources or which references
undocumented data cannot be considered reliable under Daubert.
Finally, Mr. Johnson makes many assumptions about asbestos
litigation, without ever considering that the asbestos crisis arose due to the
deliberate actions of the manufacturers in selling a dangerous and defective
product. An argument certainly can be made that the flaw with asbestos lies
not with the legal system, but rather with the manufacturers’ misconduct.
Under Daubert, an opinion formed without consideration of and exclusion
of plausible alternative causes cannot be considered reliable. Moreover,
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neither Mr. Johnson nor the General Assembly explains how capping
noneconomic damages for all tort victims in Ohio will make any perceptible
impact upon the scope of the costs of asbestos insurance reserves, nor why
the burden for the costs of the asbestos crisis should be borne by tort victims
alleging unrelated claims caused by parties unrelated to the asbestos dispute.
Such efforts to impose upon tort victims the burden of remedying an alleged
tort crisis have been previously rejected by the Ohio Supreme Court.185 Mr.
Johnson’s testimony provides no basis to revisit the issue.
In terms of the collateral source rule, the only foundation for the
General Assembly’s attempt to impose new evidentiary rules regarding
collateral benefits is the claim that twenty-one other states have done it. The
Ohio Supreme Court clearly rejected as arbitrary the legislature’s prior
attempts to diminish tort awards to victims through presumptions that the
general verdicts reflect damages offset by collateral sources.186 With no
new basis for enacting the collateral source requirements other than the
claim that other states are doing it, the provisions of Senate Bill 80
regarding collateral source must be found arbitrary and unreasonable.
VI.

APPLICATION OF ESTABLISHED RELIABILITY CRITERIA AND THE
DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS MANDATE THAT OHIO’S 2005 TORT
REFORM LEGISLATION BE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER
EVEN A RATIONAL BASIS STANDARD

In conclusion, the General Assembly cites not one piece of data that
has the necessary indicia of reliability to require reconsideration of the wellreasoned precedent by the Ohio Supreme Court finding no rational basis for
tort reform. It must be considered arbitrary for the General Assembly to
enact legislation that destroys the constitutional rights of Ohio citizens to
obtain full and fair compensation through the courts for harm caused by
tortuous conduct, when no reliable evidence of any tort crisis in Ohio has
ever been identified. Under the junk science mantra of corporate defendants
in tort litigation,187 courts should invalidate as constitutionally infirm flawed
legislation enacted based upon unreliable evidence and unsubstantiated
assumptions. Because the evidence relied upon by the General Assembly
cannot overcome the classification of junk political science, the courts must
find that Senate Bill 80 has no rational basis, and therefore cannot withstand
constitutional challenge.
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